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Introduction
The 2001 Tax Review (McLeod et al, 2001) includes a
timely discussion about the place of environmental
taxation in New Zealand. The review’s discussion paper
released on 20 June 2001 and the final report in October
2001 both devote a whole chapter to environmental
taxation. This is not surprising given the current
influence of the Greens in Parliament, the Kyoto
Protocol and the enthusiasm of some analysts for using
economic instruments to achieve environmental
outcomes.
In reviewing the academic case for environment
taxation, it is appropriate to go back to the Pigouvian
tradition, and its more recent interpretation by Coase,
Tietenberg and others. At its simplest, an efficient
Pigouvian tax and an effect regulation achieve the same
outcome. The policy analyst is indifferent. However,
given the range of real world circumstances, comparisons
can be made between doing nothing, imposing a
regulation, imposing a tax, implementing a tradeable
permits system or some other policy instrument. Analysts
are left to choose between instruments by comparing
each instrument against a set of criteria.
The Tax Review discussion paper took a cautious
approach suggesting that eco-taxes are only appropriate
when “damage of each unit of emissions is the same
across the geographic area to which the tax applies; the
volume of emission is measurable; and the marginal net
damage of emissions is measurable”. At a regional level
they are more optimistic, suggesting “eco-charges may
be appropriate at a local level”. The review does see
a real possibility for carbon taxes and notes there is
no research available about the potential impact of
methane taxes.
The Tax Review discussion paper conclusions are
driven by some critical assumptions. The authors place
a tough standard as a requirement for any environmental
tax. This requirement is not always or often met with
regulations and other policy instruments. The authors
are also concerned about taxes attenuating property
rights at all levels of production. This is certainly an
impact but it is an efficient impact. The authors suggest
that double dividends result from the transfer of rents to
the Crown and not productive efficiency. This assumption
needs to be tested theoretically and empirically. The
authors assume New Zealand should be slow to
implement taxes as part of its response to the Kyoto
protocol. This ignores the possibility that there may be
gains from early adoption.
Environmental taxation will continue to be an
important political issue in this part of the world as
evidenced by the current fuel tax enquiry in Australia.
Despite its importance, the consideration of
environmental taxation by the Tax Review Committee is
unsatisfactory. Further analysis is required which
considers the performance of environmental taxation
against other instruments used to achieve government
goals. This paper provides some history of the concept
of environmental taxation as a framework for further
research to address the issues raised by the Taxation
Review 2001. This paper should form a basis for further
work in New Zealand examining specific opportunities
for environmental and resource-use taxation.
Some History
Environmental tax reform has moved rapidly onto the
political agenda in many countries over the past decade.
In large part, it has been given impetus by the need to
deal with the risk of climate change. Despite the
continuing political stalemate, the Kyoto Protocol forced
most OECD countries to think about the mechanisms
they would use to limit emissions of greenhouse gases.
Taxation options, such as a carbon tax, held obvious
appeal and became the preferred instrument for some
countries.
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The re-emergence of Green politics, particularly in
Europe, has also revived interest in tackling the whole
range of environmental problems. Public concern about
the lack of practical solutions has been growing and
there has been mounting opposition to new forms of
environmental risk. (This is reflected in New Zealand in
the heat of the debate over genetic engineering.) Each
new exposure, such as the BSE episode, ratchets up the
level of political awareness.
The discussion of policy options has led to a general
consensus that taxes are efficient instruments to achieve
environmental targets. Since they also yield revenues,
government can look for a wider range of policy packages
to win acceptance for this approach. In New Zealand, the
recent review of the tax system and its shortcomings has
created an ideal opportunity to look at all the issues
surrounding various forms of resource-use taxation.
Such taxes are designed to internalise the social costs
of environmental degradation. Full cost pricing requires
that all costs (present, future, private and external to the
user) incurred by society during production and
consumption of a good or service be fully covered by the
price of that good or service. This is a necessary, but not
sufficient, condition for sustainability (Panayotou &
Yajun, 1999). In addition to confronting polluters with
the full costs of their polluting activities, resource taxes
can be used to optimise the consumption mix of renewable
resources and non-renewable resources.
Environmental tax reform can cover both incentives
for investment in clean technology and penalties for
continuing pollution. The mix of instruments selected
can induce more rapid or less rapid shifts in behaviour.
It is clearly desirable to seek some level of political
consensus on the rate at which adjustments should be
made. Beyond this, any government or political party
would also have the option of signalling the possibility
of future taxes or future increases. Through these
techniques, the reform process can build a continuous
process of improved environmental performance.
Taxpayers are able to reduce or avoid the tax by changing
their behaviour. Hence, taxes create a continuous
incentive to decrease pollution (EEA, 1996).
For over a decade there has been a push towards
development models which are environmentally
sensitive. The 1992 Earth Summit articulated the
principles of such development, under the umbrella
concept of ‘Sustainable Development’. This move has
coincided with the strong move away from regulatory
and interventionist techniques of economic management.
Around the world a new phase of environmental
policy has therefore opened up, using market-based
incentives for reducing pollution, limiting waste and
other environmental goals. Furthermore, as former
command economies are restructured, market-based
instruments are gaining increasing attention. For instance,
China is making use of market-based instruments to
integrate its environmental and economic policies
(Panayotou & Yajun, 1999).
In integrating these policies, a comprehensive
approach to market failure is needed. This is evident in
the energy efficiency market where there are many
factors working to discourage energy efficiency. These
include information gaps, demand for short payback
periods and tariff structures that encourage energy supply
rather than energy saving. Because of these factors, the
exclusive use of a tax to encourage energy efficiency
would require it to be set at a penal rate (EEA, 1996).
Types of Environmental Taxes
Environmental taxes can be classified into four types
according to the way in which the environmental tax is
levied (Bosquet, 2000; OECD, 1997; Panayotou &
Yajun, 1999):
i. Effluent and Emission Taxes
These are a Pigouvian type tax that is directly related
to the quantity and quality of pollutants discharged.
Examples of these include water pollution effluent
taxes and air pollution charges.
ii. Product and Input Taxes
These are indirect taxes that are based on products
that create environmental externalities when
manufactured, consumed or disposed of. Taxes on
motor fuels, pesticides, fertilisers and batteries are
examples of this class of environmental tax.
iii. Environmental Subsidies
This is where polluters are subsidised to decrease
the pollution that they generate.
iv. Investment Tax Incentives
Tax credits for environmental protection
investments are used in the Netherlands. Accelerated
depreciation for pollution control equipment and
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waste treatment facilities is used in Germany and
Japan. Canada, France and Korea undertake both
types of incentive measures.
There are three important functions of these various
taxes: cost recovery, incentive effects and revenue raising
(EEA, 1996). The choice by governments will be
influenced by the weighting they give to these overlapping
functions. The design of a specific fiscal measure will
also be determined by the same political judgement on
priorities.
Cost covering charges are designed to raise funds
needed for sustainable management of environmental
systems, environmental measures or environmental
programmes. They include earmarked charges and user
charges. For instance, France and Germany impose
charges on water pollutants that are designed to raise
revenues to cover administration expenses for water
quality management and to subsidise water quality
improving projects (Hahn, 2000). The Netherlands
implemented an aircraft noise charge, imposing a surplus
on landing fees. The revenue from this charge is
earmarked to finance measures to reduce the noise
annoyance of airports, including insulation and
redevelopment (EEA, 199).
Incentive taxes are designed to achieve a specific
environmental impact. The UK landfill tax that was
introduced in 1996 is an example of an incentive tax. The
purpose of this tax was to internalise externalities and
increase waste recycling, while reducing disposal to
landfills (Hogg, 1999).
Fiscal environmental taxes are intended primarily to
raise income for government expenditures. The
environmental effect is considered to be a side-effect
(Ribeiro, 1999). The Danish charge on non-hazardous
waste disposal is a fiscal environmental tax. The revenues
raised by this tax are part of the general budget
(EEA, 1996).
For a chronological development of environmental
taxes, see EEA, 1996, p 22.
Environmental Tax Reform
Environmental tax reform1  (ETR) is where the tax
burden is shifted from factors of production, such as
labour and capital, to pollution and the use of natural
resources (EC, 1997). The most recent and extensive
tax reforms applied in the area of environmental
protection have been implemented in Sweden (1990),
Norway (1992), Denmark (1994), Netherlands (1995)
and Finland (1997) (Álvarez et al, 1998).
Conventional taxes tend to reduce incentives for
work, savings, investment and conservation, while
increasing incentives for leisure, consumption, resource
depletion and environmental degradation. Hence, the
existing system of taxing social benefits introduces a
market distortion, while a reformed system that taxes
social costs would remove or reduce distortions and
mitigate market failures (Panayotou & Yajun, 1999).
Environmental tax reform is therefore a tool that can
be used to target the sustainable management of many
natural and physical resources. Although this same goal
is written into the Resource Management Act (1991), the
statute itself offers relatively little guidance or incentive
towards its achievement. Many stakeholders would
welcome the use of specific taxes/tax incentives to lend
weight to the Act and accelerate New Zealand’s progress
towards an ecologically sustainable economy.
Strategic tax reform would potentially involve three
complementary activities (OECD, 1997). These are:
i. removal of existing taxes and subsidies that have
negative environmental impacts; for example,
subsidies on intensive agriculture, fossil fuels, or
road and air transport will counteract the effect of
an environmental tax (EEA, 1996);
ii. restructuring of existing taxes in an environmentally
friendly manner; and
iii. introducing new environmental taxes.
Revenue Recycling
In order to make environmental tax reform politically
acceptable, many governments have combined it with
tax reduction in other areas. If total revenue is left
unchanged, this is described as revenue neutrality,
although the effects will of course vary for different
players in the economy, so the reform is only neutral in
terms of the total tax take by government. A further
choice is whether to shift the reform in a revenue-positive
or revenue-negative direction. Finland and Sweden have
both undertaken revenue-negative tax reform.
Environmental tax reform recycles the revenue that
is raised by environmental taxes by a tax reduction. This
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may involve a decrease in employers’ social security
contributions. These are the non-wage labour tax paid by
firms for each worker employed. Alternatively, personal
income taxes may be decreased. The purpose of these tax
reductions is to increase incentives to work and hire
(Bosquet, 2000). The other main revenue recycling
instruments are corporate income tax, specific commodity
taxes, general commodity taxes (such as sales or value-
added taxes) and employment taxes (Park &
Pezzey, 1999).
The revenue-recycling effect of revenue neutral
environmental tax reform is influenced by the institutional
arrangement for tax. For instance, the taxation of
unemployment benefits, the type of tax exemption and
price-indexation of unemployment benefits, and tax
exemptions are important factors in considering the
impacts of reform (Koskela & Schöb, 1999).
The double dividend debate is concerned with the
idea that an environmental tax results in more than just
an environmental improvement. The double dividend
hypothesis suggests that both the environment and the
efficiency of the tax system are improved (Park &
Pezzey, 1999). There is disagreement amongst theoretical
and empirical studies as to whether the double dividend
does occur. It is clearly not an automatic outcome. Some
analysts argue that it depends on careful design of any
environmental tax system. There is also reason to believe
that the tax system becomes less distortionary when the
revenue raised by environmental taxes is recycled
efficiently. However, most analysts only accept the
possibility of a double divided if the existing tax system
is highly distortionary (NZIER, 2001).
Both the choice of revenue recycling instrument and
the extent of any double dividend will make a difference
to the political desirability of environmental tax reform.
Relief on labour or income taxes has been the preferred
choice of governments to date (Park & Pezzey, 1999).
The evidence also suggests that any employment or
other social benefits thus generated can be used to win
support from groups such as employers and unions,
which might not support reform measures purely on the
grounds of improved environmental management.
The Effectiveness of Environmental
Tax Reform
When assessing the effectiveness of an environmental
tax, there are two criteria to be considered. First, the
effect of the tax on environmental pollution or the use
of scarce natural resources. This is the environmental
effect. The second criterion is the economic. This
involves evaluation of the level of economic resources
forgone to achieve the environmental outcome. It
includes those costs borne by consumers, firms and
taxpayers (EEA, 1996; Ribeiro, 1999).
Environmental Effectiveness
A positive environmental impact is expected from the
imposition of an environmental tax because the incentive
effects of the tax lead to a change in behaviour (Ribeiro,
1999).
To be effective, a tax needs to be as closely linked to
the externality as possible. Environmental taxes can
therefore be ranked in terms of their environmental
efficiency with (i) being most efficient and (iii) being
least (Pearce, 2000):
i. Tax on pollution itself – A tax on the environmental
impact creates an incentive to maintain output by
adopting cleaner technologies or inputs.
ii. Tax on input (e.g. coal for electricity generation) –
This encourages a switch to an alternative fuel
source such as gas, but not to cleaner coal.
iii. Tax on product itself (e.g. electricity) – This creates
less demand, but there is no direct incentive for
producers to change their fuel mix or engage in
energy efficient electricity generation.
The effectiveness of indirect taxes or incentive-
based targeting depends on the linkage and ability of the
tax to discriminate between those who are polluters, and
those who are not (Jackson, 2000).
The Swedish sulphur tax implemented in 1991 had a
considerable impact. It caused a reduction of the sulphur
content of fuel oils by almost 40% below the legal
standards (OECD, 1997; EEA, 1996).
The carbon dioxide tax in Norway went into effect in
1991. Evidence suggests that carbon dioxide emissions
from stationary combustion have decreased up to 21%
per year, while emissions from households’ motor
vehicles have been reduced 2-3% per year (EEA, 1996;
OECD, 1997).
In Denmark, a charge on the disposal of non-
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hazardous waste decreased the share of waste dumping
in overall waste treatment from 39% to 18%. The tax
also increased the rate of reuse and recycling from 35%
to 61% between 1985 and 1995 (OECD, 1997). A charge
on the sale of batteries was introduced by Sweden in
1991 to cover the costs of collection and disposal. In
1993, the collection rate for lead batteries was 95%
(EEA, 1996).
Economic Efficiency
Taxation is an efficient way to meet environmental goals
because it minimises the costs of compliance with
environmental regulation (Pearce, 2000; Tindale &
Holtman, 1996). Unlike command and control
regulation, environmental taxes have static efficiency
gains where sectors are able to select least cost
compliance methods. Taxes have additional dynamic
efficiency gains. They signal that it is best to abate in
areas with low abatement costs. They also provide
continuing incentives for improvements beyond minimal
compliance (Jackson, 2000; Pearce, 2000).
Economic efficiency is improved when the
environmental goals are to reduce resource use and
waste flows. This has been extensively documented in
the energy sector, as has the need for clear market-based
incentives. Fiscal instruments, including tax rebates,
open up a wide range of options for governments when
designing a programme of environmental tax reform.
Equity
The equity of environmental taxation matters. This is
evident, as concerns about the distributional effects of
environmental taxes have hindered the wider use of these
market-based instruments.
Intragenerational Equity
Any policy measure designed to improve the
environmental situation will have distributive effects,
but these seem to be more visible in the cast of taxes
(OECD, 1997). The distributional impacts of
environmental taxes depend on local circumstances,
location, the time horizon and how tax revenues are spent
(Panayotou & Yajun, 1999).
When environmental taxes are applied to mass
consumption products and basic commodities, regressive
effects can be expected (OECD, 1997). An environmental
tax is regressive when the tax represents a higher
proportion of the income of low-income groups than that
of the higher-income groups. This usually occurs when
the tax is applied to a product or input, rather than to
emissions or environmental damage (Pearce, 2000). For
instance, energy taxes fall heavily on the poor, reflecting
the importance of energy expenditures in the budgets of
these poorer households (Panayotou & Yajun, 1999;
Smith, 1996). Consider taxes on gasoline and vehicle
fuels. These are only regressive across those households
who own vehicles (Pearce, 2000). Furthermore, it would
be possible for the poor to be made worse off if
employment was diverted away from sectors of the
economy where those on low incomes are predominantly
employed (Park & Pezzey, 1999).
When assessing the distributional incidence of the
burden of an environmental tax, concern should be for
the final incidence (the households that ultimately bear
the burden of the tax) rather than the formal incidence
(who makes the tax payments) (Smith, 1997). Moreover,
it is the net incidence of the policy measure that matters.
The net incidence of a tax is the cost of the tax to an
individual, minus the benefit that is secured from an
increased environmental improvement (Pearce, 2000).
Furthermore, the net distributional impact is important.
For instance, a regressive impact may affect poorer
households, while related environmental improvements
may be distributed progressively (OECD, 1997).
The regressive effects of environmental taxes can be
overcome by various means. Information campaigns
can help to ensure that what is not regressive is seen not
to be regressive. It is important that the distributive
effects of the policy measure are compared with the
appropriate baseline, that is, the alternative policy
measure that would otherwise be adopted. In other
words, a tax may be regressive, but is it more regressive
than the alternative (Pearce, 2000)? Note that while
some economic instruments may be distributionally
regressive, the resources freed by greater economic
efficiency and the revenues that are generated can be
more purposely directed at addressing equity issues
(Panayotou & Yajun, 1999).
Mitigation involves modification of the policy at the
outset to take account of impacts on vulnerable groups.
Consider a tax that targets older road vehicles that are not
well maintained, or have low efficiency. This would be
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regressive, as many such vehicles are likely to be owned
by lower income groups. An alternative would be to
subsidise early retirement of such vehicles (Pearce,
2000). Mitigation can also be undertaken using cross
subsidies. For example, lifeline tariffs are familiar in the
contexts of electricity and water. These involve prices
that are lower for low-income consumers than high-
income consumers (Pearce, 2000).
However, the more exemptions or tax discriminations
there are, the less effective the tax is at meeting its
environmental objective (OECD, 1997; Pearce, 2000).
Hence, mitigation efforts should be avoided as far as
possible (OECD, 1997).
Compensation provides an alternative to mitigation.
This attempts to make vulnerable groups at least no
worse off once the policy is implemented. Compensation
is preferred to mitigation because it does not reduce the
environmental efficiency of a policy. Compensation
may be directly related to a tax (for example, specified
energy allowance to mitigate an energy tax) or may take
the form of a lump-sum payment (for example,
households receive payments equal to the average
environmental tax payment). Alternatively, the income
tax system could be changed to favour households on
low incomes, excise taxes could be lowered on goods
that are more likely to be bought by low-income
households, or investment could be made in job creation
schemes (EEA, 1996; Panayotou & Yajun, 1999; Pearce,
2000; Smith, 1996).
The need to finance such compensation partly
explains the trend towards revenue neutrality or the
recycling of revenue to compensatory use (Pearce, 2000).
Can revenue-neutral environmental tax reform be
regressive? If the environmental tax that is introduced
is more regressive than the tax that is lowered, the
overall effect of reform will be regressive (Park &
Pezzey, 1999).
Intergenerational Equity
This concept is central to any policy designed to bring
about ‘sustainable management’ or sustainable
development’ over a longer time horizon. The
environmental ethic has therefore emphasised the rights
of future generations to enjoy the same range of
resources as those available to the present generation.
It has, however, proved extremely difficult to
introduce practical policy instruments to bring this goal
within reach.
Environmental economists have argued that natural
capital should not be treated as a residual. They make a
logical case for treating natural forests, marine resources
and other ecosystems as part of a country’s resource
inventory, using accounting systems that will rapidly
reflect any depletion of this natural wealth. It follows
that environmental tax reform should bring about some
balance between the treatment of man-made capital and
natural capital, so that growth (traditionally defined) of
the former is not continually achieved at the expense of
the latter.
Tax measures and other instruments can be used to
reinforce these arguments and create a more even
approach to resource management in the longer term.
They have not generally been incorporated in the first
stages of environmental tax reform. Sometimes they
have been introduced separately for reasons that lie
outside of environmental policy. This was the case when
individual transferable quotas (ITQs) were brought in as
the management regime for New Zealand fisheries. As
suggested below, sustainable resource use should,
however, be incorporated among the objectives of any
programme of environmental tax reform.
Competitiveness
There is no significant impact on the competitiveness
of individual sectors or whole economies from current
environmental policies in OECD countries. Neither is
there evidence of industrial relocation to ‘pollution
havens’ (OECD, 1997).
When studying the impact of environmental taxes on
competitiveness, there are two components to be
addressed: macro-competitiveness and sectoral
competitiveness (Pearce, 2000). The competitiveness of
the economy as a whole (macro) is what matters (OECD,
1997). Studies on the effects of environmental regulation
generally on macro-competitiveness do not detect any
significant impact (Pearce, 2000).
On a sectoral level, energy-intensive sectors will be
most affected by environmental tax reform, while labour-
intensive sectors will benefit (Bosquet, 2000). In the
case of an energy tax, the effects on sectoral
competitiveness are small, because the loss of
competitiveness from an increase in fuel costs as a result
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of the tax is offset by a gain in competitiveness from a
decrease in labour costs (Barker, 1997).
When favourable treatment is given to energy
intensive industries, in response to competitiveness
concerns, competitive disadvantage for renewable energy
sources may result (EEA, 1996). Hence, any analysis of
competitiveness has to address the question of both
winners and losers (EEA, 1996).
There is concern that the impact on competitiveness
may also affect the environment. If production is relocated
as a result of an environmental tax, the environmental
damage is simply shifted elsewhere (EEA, 1996).
However, there is no evidence of these ‘pollution havens’
emerging. This is because many other factors influence
a firm’s decision to locate in a particular country; factors
such as the size and growth of potential markets, political
stability, labour force competence, ease of access to raw
materials or markets, and adequacy of infrastructure
(OECD, 1997).
Ultimately, the extent to which green tax reform
improves the functioning of the economy by decreasing
market distortions could enhance the long-term
competitiveness of the country as a whole
(OECD, 1997).
Mitigation of Adverse Effects on
Competitiveness
There are measures that may be taken to offset any
adverse effects that environmental taxes may have on
competitiveness.2  It is important that any such measure
do not reduce the environmental effectiveness and
economic efficiency of the tax (OECD, 1997).
Exemptions
Exemptions reduce the overall effectiveness of the
tax (Brack, 1998). Exemptions make environmental
policy more costly because they narrow the tax
base and increase the deadweight loss, as well
as compromising environmental objectives (Bohringer
& Rutherford, 1997).
Revenue Recycling
Revenue raised from the environmental tax may be used
to lower pre-existing taxes on labour. Alternatively, it
can be used to fund additional public spending on
environmental concerns (Brack, 1998).
Reform Energy Cost Provisions in Business Taxation
There could be reform of the business tax system to
provide energy efficiency incentives by not allowing
energy costs to be exempt from tax as a business
expense, except for high energy users, and by providing
a tax-free portion of total costs to all other firms
(EEA, 1996).
Tax-free Thresholds
This involves rising taxation with higher levels of
consumption of environmental goods such as water and
energy. This can lessen the impact of environmental
taxes on small firms and households (EEA, 1996).
Border Tax Adjustments
This is the adjustment of tax rates at the border so that
exports are rebated by the amount of tax they bear, and
imports from untaxed foreign competitors are taxed
equivalently (Brack, 1998). However, the rules and
practices for such measures are not fully clarified
(OECD, 1997).
International Harmonisation
Measures needed to mitigate the competitiveness
impacts of environmental taxation would be unnecessary
if there was harmonisation at, for instance, EU, OECD
or even global levels (EEA, 1996). This is best handled
by organisations such as the World Trade Organisation.
Employment
There is reason to believe that shifting the tax burden
from personal income taxes, corporation taxes or value-
added taxes towards environmental pollution will
increase employment. This is because there will be more
demand for labour-intensive commodities as prices
change in favour of these. The demand for labour will
increase due to the lower cost of labour. Furthermore,
the supply of labour will rise, as more people are
encouraged to enter the labour market as unemployment
falls. This will cause expenditure by government on
unemployment benefits and social security to fall
(Barker, 1997).
Evidence on this reduction of unemployment is
mixed (OECD, 1997). For employment gains to
materialise, the labour market must be flexible. If wages
are directly linked to the price level, then an environmental
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tax could cause inflation (Bosquet, 2000).
Potential for an employment double dividend depends
on the effectiveness of labour tax cuts in increasing
employment and on how much of the burden of
environmental taxes is borne by labour. As a significant
employment benefit would require substantial cuts in
the taxation of labour, broad tax bases would probably
be needed to make up the revenue shortfall from reduced
labour taxes (OECD, 1997).
Evidence suggests that the best results in terms of
employment are obtained when recycling occurs through
cuts in social security contributions.3  The mode of
recycling of tax revenue plays a significant role in
determining employment effects (Bosquet, 2000).
Investment, Prices, Economic Activity
Environmental policy instruments impact on incentives
to invest in environmental research and development
(R&D). New technology should be encouraged because
it offers fundamental solutions for environmental
problems. Technology is emphasised because
behavioural changes are hindered by various forms of
inertia. Hence, the appropriate choice of policy
instruments should accelerate technological innovation
(Albrecht, 1999).
Environmental taxes, without important exceptions
or escape clauses, offer the clearest incentives for
technological innovations – the more expensive the tax,
the more incentive that will be created to invest in new
emission-reducing technologies (Albrecht, 1999).
Consider, for instance, the Californian zero emissions
requirement for new vehicles. This led to a huge
investment in innovation.
The immediate effect of an isolated increase in
environmental taxes would be an increase in the general
price level. However, a revenue neutral tax would entail
a number of other effects that could partly offset this
immediate effect (OECD, 1997).
Economic activity, often measured by gross domestic
product (GDP), is positively impacted by environmental
taxes. This is because new taxes raise consumer prices
and wages, which depress economic activity. However,
after some time, the cuts in social security contributions
more than offset the negative impact on demand, leading
to gains in employment and GDP (Bosquet, 2000).
There are problems with the use of GDP as a measure of
economic activity because it does not measure long-
term sustainable growth and welfare (Bosquet, 2000).
Design and Implementation
Criteria for Consideration of a New Policy
Policy reform should be aimed at improving sustainable
resource management. There are at least five issues to
be addressed when considering a new policy (Park &
Pezzey, 1999):
i. evaluation of what causes the environmental
damage;
ii. assessment of the potential to control the adverse
effects;
iii. assessment of the potential to develop and introduce
new technologies to minimise or eliminate the
environmental damage;
iv. assessment of the financial costs to the government
or agency to monitor the results of the policy;
v. assessment of the political will to impost the costs
of control on polluting firms (and their customers).
This is related to the ‘polluter-pays principle’.
Determining a Tax Rate
Who should have the role of determining the appropriate
tax rate? Is it the role of environmental government
departments or economic government departments? It
is not appropriate for the same part of government to be
responsible for determining the rate of tax and receiving
the revenues (Smith, 1997).
How should the tax rate be set? In an ideal world, the
rate would be set with regard for economic costs and
environmental benefits. There are problems setting a tax
rate that will deal with the ecological thresholds for these
benefits and costs. In this case regulation may be better.
Linkage
The effectiveness of environmental taxation depends on
linkage. This is the degree to which a tax is linked to the
pollution it aims to control (the linkage of tax point and
point of pollution) (Paulus, 1994; Smith, 1997). Where
the link between the tax point and pollution point is
weak, the tax may fail to have the desired impact on
pollution. It may also introduce costly distortions into
production and consumption decisions (Smith, 1996).
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Consider, for example, the Norwegian charge on
domestic waste collection. This charge was based on the
number of refuse sacks that households put out for
collection. It resulted in some households economising
on sacks rather than on waste, and overfilling sacks or
dumping illegally (Smith, 1996).
Of course, the benefits of more direct linkage between
the tax and the amount of pollution caused must be
compared with the possible increase in administration
costs (Paulus, 1994).
Administration and Implementation Costs
Administration costs are the costs of assessment,
collection or enforcement of taxes. Generally, these costs
are lower for new environmental taxes that are
incorporated into the existing tax administration and
controlling systems (Paulus, 1994). The cost of the
measurement system depends on the measurement costs
per source and the number of emissions sources.
Measurement costs per source depend on the range of
monitoring technologies, the characteristics of emissions
and the substances involved (Smith, 1997). The
incorporation of measurement into normal commercial
activities can decrease measurement costs (Paulus,
1994). In general, the administrative costs of
environmental taxes compare favourably with other
policy tools (EEA, 1996).
Concordance with Existing Systems,
Frameworks and Starting Points
There may be conflict with the current national tax or
legal system if taxes and reforms cannot be embedded
into the existing system. This is because they may be
inconsistent with the restrictions of these systems. For
instance, European Union legislation prevents member
countries from levying particular types of taxes. There
must be no interference with the free movement of
goods, products, capital and services within the Union
(Paulus, 1994).
Additionally, environmental taxes must meet
generally accepted policy principles (Paulus, 1994)
such as:
• the polluter-pays principle – polluters should bear
the expenses of carrying out measures to ensure that
the environment is in an acceptable state;
• the cooperation principle – refers to possibilities for
particular societal groups and those affected by
particular environmental policy measures to
cooperation in environmental policies; and
• the precautionary principle – refers to prevention
of environmental problems.
These issues are already being considered in the case
of the Waikato River where resource use taxation is
being discussed in the negotiations between the Crown
and Tainui over future governance and management of
the river (Way & Scrimgeour, 2000).
Policy Evaluation
In evaluating the impacts of an environmental tax, there
are three complications that make evaluation difficult
(Ribeiro, 1999). First, there are methodological issues
concerned with separating the tax effects from other
elements in the baseline and policy package. Second,
the data that are available may be limited, may not be
detailed enough, or may have been collected for other
purposes and therefore are not suitable. Third, there is
the time factor. It may take up to 10 years for the tax to
be effective (EEA, 1996; Ribeiro, 1999).
The evaluation of environmental taxes needs to be
built into the design and implementation process so that
methodological and data availability problems can be
minimised. Linkage of the policy process with the
evaluation procedure is given by EEA, 1996, p 32.
Checklist for Successful Implementation
The following checklist is taken from EEA (1996, p 12):
• studies in advance investigating the potential effects
of the tax/policy package, in particular the
calculation of the abatement costs in each sector,
equity implication, and the benefits and costs of
improving eco-efficiency;
• early and greater involvement of tax/fiscal
authorities;
• extensive consultation with stakeholders and the
public;
• early announcement of environmental taxes;
• their introduction within a policy package of
complementary measures;
• gradual imposition of the tax;
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• recycling of revenues to –
taxpayers (for example, for environmental
measures, via rebates or investment
incentives, provision of information and
training)
related sectors (for example, some
revenues of a waste tax going to the
waste sector)
reduce other taxes such as taxes on labour;
• increasing incentive effect via –
gradually increasing the real price signal
over long periods
gradually reducing exemptions;
• evaluation measures designed into the tax system.
Use of Revenue
Hypothecation (Earmarking)
Hypothecation is where the revenues from a tax are pre-
assigned to certain public expenditures or to a particular
agency or department (Smith, 1997). This pre-
commitment constrains government spending in a
dynamic environment, so it could lead to inefficiency
in budgeting and expenditures (Smith, 1997).
Hypothecation may create inefficiencies because the tax
rate can be determined on the basis of revenue required,
and not on the costs and benefits of the tax. Hence,
revenue and expenditure requirements move out of line
in the long run. Furthermore, it is difficult to determine
the appropriate revenue sources for particular
expenditures.
On the other hand, most countries give low priority
to environmental expenditure, so earmarking serves to
raise the priority of particular environmental
expenditures. Earmarking creates a more direct
relationship so it is expected to increase public support
for and acceptability of a new tax. However, there is a
need to weight the costs of possible inefficiencies with
the benefits of higher support (Paulus, 1994).
It has been suggested that hypothecation is effectively
a trade-off between environmental tax reform, which
requires that government secures revenues through
environmental taxes, and the aim of compensating
polluters through recycled revenues (Pearce, 2000). The
OECD (1997) recommends that hypothecation should
be a transitory approach, if used at all because the
inefficient allocation of resource and government
spending priorities may become locked in.
General Policy Expenditure
The revenue raised by environmental taxes may be used
to reduce distortionary taxes, decrease public deficits
or increase public spending (OECD, 1997).
If environmental tax revenue is used as a substitute
for existing tax revenues, there is the question of efficiency
and public support. Additionally, the revenue raised
may be used to compensate those who suffer from the
possible undesirable effects. This raises the issue of
determining what is proper and fair compensation.
Sustainability of Revenue
Steering effects are the possible tax avoiding changes
in behaviour of those confronted with a tax. If the
steering effects of an environmental tax are substantial,
then tax bases can be largely or completely eroded
(Paulus, 1994). This is the main purpose of incentive
taxes; however, it is undesirable for revenue raising
taxes.
A successful tax, in terms of changing behaviour,
creates less revenue (Tindale & Holtman, 1996).
Ultimately, the effect of the tax on behaviour depends on
the elasticity of the good that is taxed. If it is a necessity
with few substitutes, revenue will not fall over time.
Conclusion
Environmental tax reform has a strategic role
in promoting sustainable development. This is
because environmental taxes have the potential
to achieve environmental targets as well as raise
revenue, thus integrating environmental and economic
policy goals. Environmental taxes are most effective
in achieving their objectives when they are part of
a complete policy package (Kerr, 2001). Moreover,
environmental taxes must be carefully designed
and implemented to ensure they do not impose costs
that offset their potential benefits. Given the history
and principles described in this paper it is time for
further analysis of specific environmental taxes which
could be implemented in New Zealand.
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Endnotes
1 Also called ecological tax reform, green tax reform,
environmental fiscal reform, green tax swap and
green tax shifting.
2 To the extent that it is true that no adverse impacts
on competitiveness occur due to imposition of
environmental taxes, resources can be focused on
education and communication to adjust the
misperception that such competitiveness impacts do
occur (see Pearce et al, 2000, for recommended
methods to counter lobbying insisting that
competitiveness effects do exist).
3 This is equivalent to ACC payments in the New
Zealand context.
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